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abstract
This paper describes an agent-based platform for the allocation of loads in distributed transportation
logistics, developed as a collaboration between CWI, Dutch National Center for Mathematics and Com-
puter Science, Amsterdam and Vos Logistics Organizing, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
The platform follows a real business scenario proposed by Vos, and it involves a set of agents bidding
for transportation loads to be distributed from a central depot in the Netherlands to different locations
across Germany. The platform supports both human agents (i.e. transportation planners), who can bid
through specialized planning and bidding interfaces, as well as automated, software agents. We exem-
plify how the proposed platform can be used to test both the bidding behaviour of human logistics plan-
ners, as well as the performance of automated auction bidding strategies, developed for such settings.
The paper ﬁrst introduces the business problem setting and then describes the architecture and main
characteristics of our auction platform. We conclude with a preliminary discussion of our experience
from a human bidding experiment, involving Vos planners competing for orders both against each other
and against some (simple) automated strategies.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Decentralized markets and distributed auctions have received a
lot of research interest, as important coordination mechanisms be-
tween self-interested agents. Recent research, both by the authors
of this paper and many others (Reeves, Wellman, MacKie-Mason, &
Osepayshvili, 2005; Robu & La Poutré, 2008; ‘t Hoen & La Poutré,
2006; ’t Hoen, Robu, & La Poutré, 2005) etc. proposes increasingly
complex algorithms for bidding and modeling decisions in such
agent-mediated auction environments.
Transportation logistics and supply chain management repre-
sent challenging and potentially very fruitful areas for the applica-
tion of agent-based electronic market techniques, such as auctions.
The increasing complexity and shifting structure of modern supply
chains, as well as increasing competitive pressures in this market
has led to an increasing demand and interest in such distributed
optimization techniques, involving multiple parties. The practical
impact of improved allocation which can be achieved through such
techniques can be signiﬁcant. For example, in the Netherlands, the
average transport performance is between 40% and 60%. Improving
this utilization rate is also the goal of the DEAL (Distributed Engine
for Advanced Logistics) project, which groups together several uni-
versities and large logistics service providers in the Netherlands.
The work reported here was also carried out in the framework of
this project, involving two of the main partners, namely CWI,
Amsterdam and Vos Logistics Organizing, Nijmegen, the
Netherlands.
1.1. The multi-party logistics domain
Several trends have recently produced a signiﬁcant impact on
the area of transportation logistics. One of these is an increase in
competition, with the continual entry of new carriers in the market
pushing down expected proﬁt margins. Another one is the increas-
ing complexity and sophistication of modern supply chains. In fact,
due to increasing and shifting trade patterns, not only transporta-
tion chains have become more dynamic, but also their structure
has become increasingly complex.
For example, nowadays it is no longer the case that the com-
pany that accepts a transportation order also owns the actual
capacity (i.e. trucks) to carry it. Often, multinational companies
with large, regular amounts of cargo to be delivered prefer to out-
source these orders to other companies that undertake to ﬁnd con-
venient delivery options, within a set of pre-negotiated terms.
These intermediary logistic companies then negotiate the distribu-
tion of these orders with other smaller companies who have the
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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/eswaactual transportation capacity (which own the actual trucks and
hire the drivers). This can be actually a cheaper option in many
cases, as smaller transportation companies often do not have the
complex cost structure that larger companies have (Robu et al.,
2008; van Amstel & Goor, 2003; van der Putten, Robu, La Poutré,
Jorritsma, & Gal, 2006).
In standard transportation management literature (van Amstel
& Goor, 2003) such distributed supply chains are called multi-party
logistics. Existing literature (van Amstel & Goor, 2003) identiﬁes
several classes of logistic provider companies, based on the type
of services they offer. Although there is some disagreement about
the exact usage of the terms, in our approach (and the remainder of
this paper) we use the term 3PL company (third-party logistics
providers) to denote those that have their own transport capacity
(i.e. truck ﬂeet) and plan this own capacity and 4PL company (i.e.
fourth-party logistics provider) to denote those companies which
‘‘orchestrate” the supply chain, i.e. acquire large sets of orders from
large shippers and then re-distribute these orders among a set of
other companies with actual transport capacity.
1.2. Company proﬁle
Founded in 1944 as a one-truck company, transporting loads
between Oss and Nijmegen in The Netherlands, Vos Logistics has
grown into one of the larger logistics service providers in Europe.
It has over 3000 trucks, 10000 trailers and containers, 325 storage
silos and 2 rail service centers. Vos employs 5000 people working
at more than 45 locations throughout Europe, while annual turn-
over approaches 1 billion euro.
1 The increasing complexity of
transportation chains has induced Vos Logistics to offer new solu-
tions to its large corporate customers (shippers), which can now
outsource all of their transportation activities to Vos. This lets them
avoid the problem of ﬁnding and negotiating with individual sup-
pliers, billing, following up orders etc. Another advantage of using
this outsourcing service for large shippers is that Vos Logistics has
a much better knowledge of the transportation market, so it is bet-
ter positioned to ﬁnd suitable sub-contractors. Vos Logistics Orga-
nizing from Nijmegen (henceforth abbreviated VLO in this paper) is
a subsidiary of Vos Logistics B.V. that was set up in order to handle
such complex supply chain orchestration activities. Based on the
taxonomy above, VLO (the subsidiary) can be seen as a 4PL com-
pany, though its parent company, Vos Logistics was founded as a
3PL company and does have its own trucks. Hence, VLO acts as
an intermediary company that acquires large (sets of) orders from
suppliers and negotiates the allocation of the orders, the terms of
transportation (i.e. delivery deadlines, destination) as well as the
price at which other carrier companies subcontract these orders.
1.3. Automating multi-party logistics using agents
The focus of this work is on automating, through an agent sys-
tem the second part of the market interaction, i.e. the daily out-
sourcing of transportation orders to carrier companies who will
actually transport them. The ﬁrst part, which is actually acquiring
these orders from large shippers presents less opportunities for
automation through a multi-agent system. The reason is that these
contracts are usually fewer, larger and closed over a longer time
horizon (e.g. a company based in the US may delegate to Vos Logis-
tics Organizing the delivery of the goods imported into Europe over
a period of one year). Such large, complex type of decisions cannot
yet be expected to be delegated to software agents.
However, allocation of orders on a daily basis to different 3PL
carriers was identiﬁed as an area with clear potential to beneﬁt
from more automated techniques (our previous AAMAS’06 survey
paper (van der Putten et al., 2006) examined this potential). This
automation would involve decision support systems for human
planners in the ﬁrst stage, and next some of the decisions could
be delegated to software agents.
A ﬁnal note about how the allocation occurs in current practice:
in the Vos case, negotiation over most orders occurs in a small
group of companies who are invited to submit bids for different or-
ders as they arrive in the system. In some cases in which no rea-
sonably priced offer is made, Vos may also solicit other outside
companies and carriers to submit a bid (this includes multimodal
options, such as rail or water transportation carriers). However,
these cases are mostly exceptions (they account for less than 20%
of the total value of the orders (van der Putten et al., 2006)), so
most business is conducted in a group of (up to) 10 companies that
can submit bids for a given set of orders. This is the case we are
interested in automating through the auction platform presented
in this paper.
1.4. Goals of this work
Over the years, several successful agent-based auction plat-
forms have been developed in order to allow comparison and
evaluation of automated trading strategies. The Trading Agent
Competition is, perhaps, the most well-known example of this
(see (Wellman, Greenwald, & Stone, 2007) for an overview) –
most related to this work being its supply chain version (Sadeh,
Eriksson, Finne, & Janson, 2003). These platforms are, however,
simply not suitable for our basic goal, which is to convince the
Vos Logistics Organizing management (and their partner carrier
companies) that agent-mediated electronic auctions can actually
be used in practice to automate their daily outsourcing of trans-
portation orders. For this purpose, a custom-based platform was
required, modeled around a business case which the planners
that actually perform these operations daily can easily recognize
and use.
Since the ﬁnal system is to be used by logistics planners, such
a system should closely resemble a real-world case, and allow its
users to identify the bidding and planning decisions to be taken
in this platform as decisions they would usually also take in real
life. It should have an interactive, intuitive interface and, more-
over, it should seamlessly integrate human agents who take
planning and bidding decisions with automated agents imple-
menting an algorithmic strategy or heuristic. This point is espe-
cially important for acceptance, since during operational
adoption of such a system, it is not realistic to expect that a
company would immediately delegate all market decisions to a
piece of software, without being conﬁdent that such decisions
closely model those their human planners would make. To sum-
marize, the goals of this project (and corresponding platform)
are:
 The overall goal of the project is to demonstrate the feasibility
of applying such an auction system in the day-to-day transpor-
tation outsourcing activities of Vos Logistics Organizing (VLO),
Nijmegen.
 As a more detailed goal, the platform should allow us to illus-
trate how different mechanism choices, such as allowing ﬂexi-
ble pick-up/delivery times or decommitment (’t Hoen et al.,
2005) (with or without a penalty) can improve efﬁciency and
participant proﬁts.
From an AI or agent researcher’s point of view, the developed
system can also form a platform to test different aspects of distrib-
uted decision making in logistics auctions, more speciﬁcally:
1 These ﬁgures are valid for the 2006/2007 ﬁnancial year.
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this stage, some very simple strategies have been developed,
whose role is mostly to stabilize the market, to make it more
realistic. However, more intelligent strategies for this setting
can be easily added to the existing platform.
 The demonstrator can also be seen as a platform for analyzing
and testing the behaviour of human planners taking part in such
an auction.
We wish to emphasize that this paper is not concerned with
proving that any particular bidding strategy, mechanism or sched-
uling method is superior to others. The readers can consult work
by (some of) the authors of this paper which presents and evaluates
suchstrategies,atamoreabstractlevel,in’tHoenetal.(2005),Robu
and La Poutré (2008), Mous, Robu, and La Poutré (2008) and ‘t Hoen
and La Poutré (2006). Rather, our goal in this project is to build an
environment which directly models current business practice in
transportation logistics (more speciﬁcally, a real business case pro-
vided by Vos Logistics Organizing, Nijmegen)and in which different
analytically-developed strategies can be adapted and tested.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
a high-level overview of our platform and the business case on
which it is based. Section 3 describes in more detail the auctioneer
agent, as well as the auction protocol used. Section 4 describes the
functionality and behaviour of the automated agents that are cur-
rently part of the proposed platform, while Section 5 describes the
human agent interface and functionality. Section 5 also introduces
the cost structure that was used for the agents and the planning
assistance interface that was built to assist human planners in tak-
ing bidding decisions. Section 6 presents some (very preliminary)
results and impressions from a study conducted at Vos Logistics,
involving 6 human planners bidding against each other and against
our agents, while Section 7 concludes the paper with a discussion.
2. Overview of the business case and our platform
The demonstration takes its starting point in a real-world case
of how transportation loads from a depot in the south of the Neth-
erlands can be distributed across Germany. In order to preserve the
privacy of Vos Logistics Organizing, as well as their customers and
business partners, some parts of the model are purposely left
unspeciﬁed or details have been slightly changed, without really
affecting how realistic our model is. This especially holds for the
names of the customer companies and some speciﬁc details about
the data used. The main reason for this is that our platform is in-
tended for evaluation not only by planners employed by Vos Logis-
tics, but also by those of some partner companies. The main parts
of the problem setting can be summarized as:
 All orders used in the demonstration will be ﬁctive (i.e. ran-
domly generated, not real orders), but, in order to assure the
platform is realistic, their destination postcodes, weights, times
of delivery etc. are based on real-world distributions.
 All outgoing orders are assumed to be delivered starting from a
depot near Maastricht (a town in the south of the Netherlands),
while possible return freight (i.e. pick-up) orders appear at des-
tinations across Germany.
 There are n players playing the role of the carriers (this can vary,
we estimated that in our setting it will be around 10) and one
player in the role of VLO (i.e. the auctioneer).
 Each carrier has k trucks to plan (in our demonstration, in order
to allow the players to follow all the details simultaneously, we
agreed k could be relatively small, e.g. k =5 ...10). Each truck
has a standard capacity of 26 pallets, where pallets are all
assumed to have a standard weight of 1000 kg/pallet.
2.1. Generating transportation orders
A data set of about 4000 orders was supplied by Vos Logistics,
corresponding to orders for a period of time from a real case. These
real orders never actually appear in our simulated platform, since
that might violate conﬁdentiality agreements between VLO and
the shipper company. However, the orders actually appearing in
our platform very closely resemble real orders, as follows.
The German destination (or origin) postcode for each order,
which is a two-digit number, was generated as follows. The ﬁrst di-
git (corresponding to the broad geographical region), was gener-
ated at random using the probability distributions extracted from
real data. The weight of the order (expressed in the number of pal-
lets from 1...26), was also generated at random, again from a dis-
tribution extracted from the data. In general, some order weights
are much more common than others and, furthermore, this also
varies by delivery region: some regions receive larger cargo orders,
while for some smaller, more frequent orders are the norm.
2 There-
fore, the distribution for generating the weight is also dependent
on the delivery region (corresponding to the ﬁrst digit of the post-
code). Finally, the second digit of the postcode (which corresponds
to a speciﬁc town within this general postcode region) was gener-
ated at random, but 50% of the weight was given to the 2–3 most
important second digits for the area (usually corresponding to a
larger town or population center).
In order to have a closed loop demonstration, we assume that
the carriers also have return orders available. The return orders
are, conceptually, offered by sellers from different areas – although
in our demo they will be sold through the same auction mecha-
nism. Outgoing and return orders have asymmetric distributions
(60% of all orders are outgoing and only 40% are return orders). This
is also realistic for this business scenario, given available data. In
real life there are two types of orders: ‘‘ON” orders (which must
be delivered exactly on their target delivery date) and ‘‘BY” orders
(which are to be delivered by a certain deadline date, where early
delivery is allowed). To simplify the setting, and also allow more
ﬂexibility in planning, all orders in our simulated platform will
be considered ‘‘BY” orders.
Another very important parameter in such a platform is the
lead-time of an order, which, roughly deﬁned, represents the dif-
ference in days between the time when an order is to be delivered
(i.e. the delivery time or deadline) and the time when the order
actually appears in the platform (is put up for auction). Here, we
also follow a pattern extracted from the real data, as described in
the following.
Each order is assigned a random lead-time, produced using a
series of adapted, lognormal distributions. The peak of these log-
normals will be the ﬁrst acceptable lead-time day for the order
(see Fig. 1 for an illustration). Because such distributions have a
long tail, this means that orders to be delivered 3, 4 days or even
a week after the minimum lead-time can still appear, albeit with
exponentially decreasing probability. For example, most orders to
be generated with a minimum lead-time of 1 are to be delivered
in the next two days.
The reasons why we need several lognormal distributions is
that different types of orders have different lead-times (we identi-
ﬁed 3 categories, according to the order data supplied). Thus, or-
ders that are to be delivered to postcode regions in the west of
Germany (places closed to the Dutch border) and whose delivery
and return trip can be completed within the same day have, in gen-
eral, shorter lead-times than orders that require a minimum of two
days travel (including the return trip).
2 While we cannot give the full details, a statistically weak, but still signiﬁcant
correlation coefﬁcient of g = 0.4 was found between the delivery area postcode and
the size of an order.
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As one would expect in any auction platform, the ﬁnal price for
each order will be determined by the bidding in the open market.
However, in an interactive demonstration, we had to build in a
mechanism to assure that prices for the orders quickly converge
to actual prices (in euro) that human planners would expect to
see. Fortunately, also in current practice there is a mechanism to
assure this. There is a partner company of Vos Logistics (the name
of which, again, we cannot give for privacy reasons), that can trans-
port orders to any destination in Germany. They do provide a stan-
dard price scheme which quotes a delivery price for any
combination of order size (in number of pallets) and German post-
code region. It is very important to stress that these are maximal
prices: in general VLO expects to get (and usually gets) much bet-
ter delivery prices from their closed group negotiation with the
partner carriers, otherwise it would be unable to make a proﬁt.
The services of this company are only considered if Vos fails to at-
tract a realistic bid for an order from any of the carriers in their
closed group (which can sometimes happen, though rather
seldom).
However, having such a set of prices is useful in our system, be-
cause it provides a benchmark of what kind of prices are realistic.
The way we use this information is in designing the bidding strat-
egy of our automated agents, whose bidding strategy will depend
on this standard prices (an exact description of the functionality
of these automated agents is provided in Section 4). The point of
these agents, in this version of the software, is not to beat the hu-
man planners, but to assure that the competition bids they see
(and implicitly, the bids they have to submit to beat them), are
around actual market prices they would encounter in real life.
Henceforth in this paper, we will refer to this set of prices as the
standard industry price table.
Finally, a word should be said about cost data. We have also ob-
tained and incorporated in the cost structure of the bidders, de-
tailed information tables about the exact driving times and
distances to any postcode location in Germany, as well as realistic
estimations of the ﬁxed costs (e.g. driver salaries, truck mainte-
nance) and variable costs per km (including driving tax and fuel
costs). These were incorporated in the cost structures of the bid-
ders when planning their routes (a thorough description is pro-
vided in Section 5).
3. Auction protocol and design of the auctioneer agent
This section describes the main characteristics of the auction
protocols used, as well as other characteristics of the auctioneer
agent. To allow more planning ﬂexibility, but also to follow current
tendering practices, orders with different lead-times are auctioned
with slightly different auction protocols, as described below.
3.1. Auction set-up
Loads are auctioned sequentially (or in 3–5 small batches dis-
tributed throughout the day). This resembles current transporta-
tion practice. Often, loads are offered by different shippers, who
have different deadlines throughout the day for placing their
orders.
For the current set-up, all auctions are descending English auc-
tions, but adapted to better ﬁt the actual tendering process, as it is
currently performed. There are two main types of auctions, differ-
entiated by the their closing protocol.
3.2. Auctions for loads with a short lead-time
This protocol (more similar to ascending English auctions
3), is
applied to orders with delivery deadlines which are 1 or 2 days away
from the current time. The auction is incrementally descending
(lowest offer wins). After the last offer has been placed, the other
bidders are given at least 1/2 h to respond with a new offer, after
which the auction closes and the lowest bidder so far is awarded
the order. Of course, in our simulated environment 1/2 h is replaced
by 30 s to 1 min. The actual delay to be used (in number of seconds)
can be speciﬁed by the user controlling the auctioneer agent,
through an interface. Therefore, our auctions have a ‘‘soft” closing
time (deadline), i.e. they are extended for a short time after the last
bid is received, in order to allow other bidders the chance to respond
to it.
3.3. Auctions for orders with a longer time horizon
For orders with delivery deadlines over 3 days into the future,
the simpliﬁed protocol cannot be applied, since most bidders do
not plan so far in advance. Additionally, some ﬂexibility must be
added in the simulations, in order for us to observe the beneﬁts
of allowing time window relaxation and adding a penalty for de-
layed orders (we return to discuss this issue in Section 5.2).
Therefore, for such orders we use the following decision proce-
dure. For each order, we set a reservation threshold (visible or
invisible to the bidders themselves), which gives a reasonable mar-
ket cost of the order which a shipper would accept in order to have
a commitment (without waiting until the last moment to go
through the auctions). In our demonstration, the threshold could
be set as a percentage below the standard industry price table
(as described above) for this conﬁguration of load and destination
postcode.
When the order appears in the system, all bidders are informed
and can make offers. If a carrier makes a bid that is higher than the
reservation price (i.e. not acceptable), then the offer is rejected, the
carrier is informed of this and can bid again. A rejected offer (above
the reservation price) is thus non-binding to either party, i.e. no
commitment exists. If any carrier makes a bid that is below the res-
ervation threshold, and thus acceptable, then all carriers are in-
formed and the auction is moved to the ‘‘usual” auction queue
(i.e. sold through the auction protocol described in Section 3.2).
3 To be more precise, this extending deadline protocol resembles the most the
protocol used by the e-commerce site Amazon.com.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Lead time (days) of the order
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
o
r
d
e
r
s
)
Delivery deadline of a random order w.r.t. the day it appears in the system
Fig. 1. Example distribution of delivery deadlines for orders, in number of days
from the present time, for a load with minimum lead-time of 1. The date when an
order appears in the system corresponds to the origin.
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ﬁrst offer is made, otherwise the contract is awarded to the initial
bidder. If, by 2 days before the deadline, no carrier made a bid in
the ‘‘acceptable” range (i.e. below the reservation price), then the
load is still auctioned using the ‘‘usual” procedure, described in
Section 3.2.
This protocol ensures that bidders that wish to plan in advance
are give the chance to do so, but only if they make a reasonable of-
fer, where by ‘‘reasonable” we mean considerably below the price
that could be expected to be achieved by waiting closer to the ac-
tual deadline. An optional alternative, that could be of interest
here, is to allow the human playing the VLO side to change the
acceptable reservation threshold during the game, if time passes
and an order does not appear to attract enough attention and thus
risks remaining undelivered.
Finally, as a future research idea, the reservation threshold
could be made dynamic (i.e. automatically increasing), according
to a discount function. This function would balance the shipper’s
desire of getting a better price for his delivery and the risk of not
getting his load delivered in time, as the deadline approaches. This
is relatively easy to implement in the current demonstration tool
but, at least for the moment, we prefer to focus on usability studies
using the simpler setting.
3.4. Total capacity of loads to be generated per day
A problem that arises in designing such an agent trading plat-
form is to choose the total capacity of orders which should be gen-
erated per day. This choice is an important one, because it gives the
player an impression of how ‘‘competitive” the whole scenario
feels. We propose an estimation model for the total capacity of
the market that depends on several parameters:
 n – number of participants representing carriers
 k – number of trucks/participant (our case, e.g. k =5 )
 p = 26 – number of standard pallets/truck
 s – a coefﬁcient representing the ‘‘saturation” of the market.
This is an important parameter, which allows us to control
the market balance between demand (i.e. coming from out-
standing orders) and available supply of transportation
capacity.
A rough heuristic evaluation of the total capacity of the simu-
lated market we consider will be given by:
s  n  k  p
Thus, orders will be generated at random using the above distri-
butions, until the total capacity reaches the above value (after
choosing the saturation parameter s). This will necessarily be only
a rough estimation: because orders are at random and there are
time window constraints, there is no real way to know what is
the true capacity of the market – unless we would centrally com-
pute, in advance, the best possible plan for the day for all available
trucks. This is not really feasible and it is also not required, because
in practice not all capacity of the trucks of a carrier company is
allocated in the ‘‘closed group” auction. In practice, trucks taking
part in such an auction may also acquire loads elsewhere – and
they only ﬁll up using the current auction. Furthermore, there
could be some differentiation between the capacities of different
players.
In order to account for this, we could make the following
choice: of the total estimated market capacity, we consider that
i% is ﬁlled from other sources (‘‘i” stands for the initial ﬁll percent-
age). Thus, an estimated s  n  k  p  1  i
100

in total capacity will
be ﬁlled through the auctions, and s  n  k  p  i
100 will be pre-
ﬁlled, through a heuristic, before the auction starts.
3.5. Auctioneer user interface
A screen shot of the auctioneer interface is presented in Fig. 2.
As is readily apparent from this ﬁgure, all interfaces were designed
in the Dutch language, to ease understanding in a logistics business
environment, which is our target audience. However, we believe
this paper should provide sufﬁcient description to allow a non-
Dutch speaker to understand our platform’s functionality and
capabilities.
Basically, both the order generation and awarding of orders (i.e.
auction closing process) executed by the auctioneer platform can
be run in two possible ways:
 Automated control: In automatic order generation, the user only
speciﬁes the parameters of the generation process (as described
above) and the arrival rates of orders in the platform. In auto-
matic tendering mode, the auctioneer waits a number of sec-
onds after the last received bid (which the user speciﬁes
through the interface) before making the decision to award
the order. This actually varies based on the order lead-time, as
described in Section 3.2. Orders with longer lead-times, which
remain open for bids until a few days before the delivery dead-
line, are temporarily shown in a different list and are moved to
the ‘‘active bidding” queue two days before expected delivery.
 Human control: In our interface, a human auctioneer (represent-
ing the 4PL company, in this case Vos Logistics Organizing) can
make, change or correct any of the decisions taken by the sys-
tem (either order generation or tendering of orders). We found
this is a very useful feature in any live, interactive simulation
with several human planners, who ﬁrst are required to get used
to the interface etc. This lets the human auctioneer feel ﬁrmly in
control of the process, even if he chooses to let the software
agent take some of the decisions on his/her behalf.
The switch between these modes can be performed dynamically
(and online), by simply checking/unchecking a multi-option box.
4. Automated bidders: description and user interface
The role of the automated bidding agents is to ensure the stabil-
ity of the market and that prices in the demonstrator converge to a
realistic level. Therefore, it is enough in a ﬁrst implementation, if
the automated agents use a simple, myopic bidding strategy. The
bids are simply based on a standard industry price table (c.f. Sec-
tion 2.2), which gives a rate for each combination of load/delivery
region.
Since this is an English auction, there are two levels, which are
randomly determined for each bidding agent: the level of the ini-
tial bid and the reservation level (i.e. the lowest the agent will go
with his/her bids). Both are generated at random from normal dis-
tributions, which are centered at certain levels above and below
those taken from our industry price table, as supplied by Vos Logis-
tics. The parameters to be set for automated strategies are:
 Percentage of mean mark-up of the initial bid over the industry
price table (and the corresponding dispersion).
 Percentage of the reservation price vs. standard industry price
table, for that postcode region and weight (again, this is the
mean of the distribution, and a dispersion is also chosen).
 Concession speed (giving how fast the agent’s bids go down
from his initial price to the reservation price, i.e. frequency of
bidding).
 Number of automated bidders and percentage of orders the
automated agents bid on. This give the pressure that indepen-
dent bidders apply on the market.
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This section aims to give a technical description of the problem
faced by the human carriers in our model and the interface avail-
able to them in the demonstrator. More precisely, two distinct
interface windows are available to human carriers:
 One for visualizing ongoing auctions for loads and bidding
 One for planning assistance, in which human planners are given
a stylized impression of their transportation capacity (i.e.
trucks) and can visualize and automatically determine the
way acquired orders (or orders the user currently considers bid-
ding on) ﬁt in their already planned routes, as well as the
expected costs.
The interface for visualizing the list of auctions and placing of
bids is not illustrated here, as it is similar (in appearance, not nec-
essarily in functionality), to the auctioneer’s interface screen from
Fig. 2. Figs. 3–5 all show different situations for the planning sup-
port interface, which is the most important for the planners, since
it helps them decide how to bid and which kind of transportation
order combinations would be proﬁtable for them.
5.1. Transportation model and carrier costs
The transportation planning problem, is, in itself, a complex one
to solve. The bidding decisions which the carrier takes are directly
dependent on the way the carrier can ﬁt the loads he is bidding on
in his/her already existing plans (i.e. how well he/she can form
proﬁtable bundles of loads during planning). In turn, this depends
on the cost model. Our tool does provide planning assistance, by
computing the costs for each combination of loads considered. In
our model, costs of each carrier are of two types:
 Fixed costs, per day and per truck. These are expressed as a
ﬁxed amount (in euro).
 Variable costs: all these costs are assumed to be proportional to
the distance travelled. These are expressed as a cost in euro per
kilometer travelled.
Both of these are set to a realistic level, after discussions with
Vos Logistics. The distances within Germany, as well as from Maas-
tricht to/from destination postcodes in Germany are computed
based on a supplied distance table. This distance table contains,
for each pair of ﬁrst two digits of German postcodes, a distance
in km, as well as a distance in km from any German postcode to/
from Maastricht.
Our planning tool enables the carrier to visualize how ﬁlled the
trucks are at each time point, the time windows in which loads can
be delivered, as well as any violation of constraints. There are sev-
eral types of constraints that need to be met in transportation set-
tings. First there are obvious capacity constraints: a truck cannot
be ﬁlled at any one time with more than 26 pallets. Second, there
is a strict legal constraint about the maximal driving time any dri-
ver can actually drive per day – in the EU, this is ﬁxed at 9 h. Any
driving plan has to satisfy these constraints to be feasible.
The tool also provides decision support (see below), by comput-
ing the length of the route for the partial daily plan – and, thus, the
costs incurred so far, for each possible bid the human planner
chooses to make. The length of the route is computed (given the
distance table available), through a simple insertion heuristic.
Insertion heuristics are known to provide a very good approxima-
tion of the optimum in small settings – and are known to be
Fig. 2. Part of the interface of the auctioneer, showing 4 windows (in clockwise order): 1. List of transportation orders already auctioned, but still to be transported; 2. List of
transportation orders currently being auctioned; 3. Control panel for setting game and simulation parameters (such as automatic or manual allocation of orders); 4. Manual
control panel for load parameters.
3488 V. Robu et al./Expert Systems with Applications 38 (2011) 3483–3491Fig. 3. Basic layout of the planning support window, showing 3 trucks and one transportation day horizon. Each line represents a truck, and each colored container a load (see
below for a description of the symbols on each load). For each day, the costs (Ko), proﬁts (Wi) and total traveling times (TT) are computed by the system. For the second truck,
the interface shows that inserting an additional load (shown in brownish yellow) in the driving schedule would lead to a violation of the legal driving hours constraints for
this truck. The right-hand side shows a window with the map of Germany (shown here reduced), which helps human planners in exploring load combinations. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 4. Layout of the planning support window, showing a set of [green] loads, which have already been contracted. As before, for each day, the costs (Ko), proﬁts (Wi) and
total traveling times (TT) are computed by the system. Vertical yellow lines represent day boundaries, which can be removed by the user to allow for multi-day planning. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 5. Left: A number of pallets constraint violation (maximum admitted, 26 pallets/truck), and two possible solutions (center and right), with loads being moved to different
days.
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a more advanced method. Thus, at each point, the expected proﬁt
the agent can make so far can also be computed.
5.2. Penalty for late deliveries
An issue of relative importance in actual applications is what
happens if delivery is (slightly) late, compared to the agreed date.
4
In real life, this does happen to a very small percentage of accepted
orders, because proﬁt margins in transportation logistics are tight
and carriers have to try to make use of all possible bundling op-
tions. Given the business of the underlying customer company,
we have decided not to treat slight delays as a strict, inviolable
constraint, but to allow orders to be maximum one day late,
against payment of a penalty. There are two ways to model the
penalty in our system:
 Fixed costs/day of delay (e.g. 50–100 euro for each day the truck
is late).
 Proportional, as a percentage of the total value of the transpor-
tation order.
In our setting, we currently implement a ﬁxed penalty/day of
delay – as opposed to a penalty which is proportional to the value
of the order. This is a realistic model, since any delay can be seen as
a loss in the reputation of the carrier, regardless of the size or ac-
tual value of the order. It is up to the bidding carrier if he chooses
to incur this penalty in his planning, but in the current set-up only
exceptionally proﬁtable planning conﬁgurations would justify the
chosen level of penalty for an order. Future versions of the system
could consider allowing for differentiated bidding, based on the ex-
act date when the order is delivered (an option discussed in van
der Putten et al. (2006)).
5.3. Information supplied about other carriers during the competition
An important point to be discussed is what kind of information
should be available to human bidders (carriers) in the tool, regard-
ing the activity of the other bidding carriers. This represents a
trade-off decision, since on one hand we need to model real life
and not compromise the privacy of competing parties, on the other
hand in a dynamic simulation environment, agents can be ex-
pected to have a reasonable idea about their competition. The fol-
lowing choices have been made:
 Regarding other bids made on existing orders (which the agent
is also interested in), the agent should be able to visualize the
amounts of the competing bids for the loads he/she is also inter-
ested in, but not the identity of the other bidders. Otherwise
said, he can see how far he needs to lower his prices to win,
but not where the competition for the orders is coming from.
 At the end of each day, a ‘‘leader board” is displayed, giving the
gross proﬁts rates so far, for all human carriers in the game. We
recognize this information about the competition may not be
known in real life, but it may be important in an interactive,
game-like simulation scenario for the participants to have a sig-
nal of how well they are doing, by comparison to their compe-
tition. Also, only knowing the proﬁt margins does not reveal
much (if anything) about the bidding strategy and underlying
planning of the competing carriers.
5.4. Planning and bidding decision support interface
Thesoftwaredevelopedforhumancarrieragentshastwodistinct
interfaces: the bidding and the planning support interfaces. In this
paper we only illustrate (in Figs. 3–5) some of the features of the
planning support interface, as the bidding interface contains rela-
tively straightforward lists of orders one which one can place bids.
The planning interface (see Figs. 3–5) consists of several hori-
zontal lines, one per each truck that the carrier owns. All trips
are assumed to be return trips to/from a depot in Maastricht, for
any postcode address in Germany. These trips can be one-day trips,
for short-distance orders or two-day trips, for destinations further
away (the choice is made by simply clicking a yellow vertical bar).
The interface is a drag-and-drop one, which makes it intuitive
and very easy to use. Loads are marked in the system by colored
rectangular shapes, marked by two arrows. The side arrows repre-
sent pick-up, respectively drop-off points, within the schedule of
that day. Each load is marked with: its load no (L), the 2-digit Ger-
man postcodes of the source (V) and destination (T), number of
pallets (P) and time it takes to transport this load (T). The total
number of pallets and total traveling time are shown below a black
line. Constraint violations will automatically be highlighted in red.
Load symbols can have 3 possible colours:
 Green: Loads which have been already acquired (and awarded
to the carrier) in auction and which need to be planned for
transportation.
 Light blue: Loads for which a bid has been placed (thus the car-
rier agent is bound by the bid he made, since bids are binding),
but which have not been won yet by the carrier at the price he
offered.
 Yellow–brown: Loads which are only placed for tentative plan-
ning to see if the planning constraints (total driving time, num-
ber of pallets etc.) can still be satisﬁed given already acquired
loads, as well as an estimate of expected proﬁts.
For each truck timeline and day, the system automatically com-
putes the total driving time and the number of pallets loaded and
automatically signals (by highlighting in red) if any constraints are
being violated. The most useful feature for deciding the minimum
bid level is, however, the online computation of the potential proﬁt
and loss to be made by inserting a load in the current route. This is
basically the difference between the current bid made for the load
and the cost of the extra travel detour for delivery/picking up that
load. Empty scheduled already start with a negative proﬁt associ-
ated to them, equalling the ﬁxed costs per day and truck.
For loads that have not been bid on yet, but are tentatively
dragged and dropped into the schedule, the information about
changes in pricing provides very useful information about what
is the minimum bid that can be placed if the carrier decides to ac-
quire that load.
6. Industrial adoption case study
A large-scale, realistic demonstration of the platform involving
6 experienced Vos transportation planners was performed at Vos
Logistics. In this test, planners were asked to bid against each other
and against our software agents for loads, and their strategies as
well as the proﬁt they made with the acquired loads was recorded.
After this demonstration, several conclusions were highlighted
regarding the performance of our automated auction system:
 First, the bidding and planning support interfaces were consid-
ered very helpful and realistic by all the planners involved.
Some participants even claimed they were superior to the plan-
ning system currently being used in everyday planning.
4 As already discussed in Section 2, early deliveries are allowed, since we consider
all our orders ‘‘BY” type of orders.
3490 V. Robu et al./Expert Systems with Applications 38 (2011) 3483–3491 The presence of automated bidding agents (although they cur-
rently only bid based on a randomly perturbed set of industry
prices), is crucial for the stability of the market and the conver-
gence of prices to realistic levels.
 The proﬁt levels in the simulation do, very roughly, commensu-
rate with the skill of the bidder. However, in order to ensure
that the proﬁt rates actually match current practice, the pricing
scheme and other system parameters require some further
reﬁnement.
 The planning scenarios considered in the simulation could be
expanded to consider some other situations appearing in real
life (e.g. multiple one-day return trips).
 Other, more advance functionality could be built into the plat-
form, such as support for combinatorial bidding (Sandholm,
2002) or allowing the possibility of decommitment for loads
already acquired (a possibility analytically studied by us in ’t
Hoen et al. (2005)).
Overall, the planners and managers present were quite im-
pressed with the faithfulness to reality of our platform, and it was
agreed that a larger test will be conducted, as well as more concrete
steps will be taken towards operational use of such techniques.
7. Discussion
Transportation logistics represents an important application
area for multi-agent systems, due to its inherently distributed
and dynamic nature. Several approaches have been presented in
recent years to this problem, some leading to commercially suc-
cessful, operational systems. The LS/AT system, presented in Dorer
and Calisti (2005) is one of the most well-known systems that uses
agent techniques (mostly constraint-reasoning type techniques)
for dynamic transport optimization. The Magenta system (Skob-
elev, Glaschenko, Grachev, & Inozemstev, 2007) is another such
system, which explores the use of swarm-based optimization tech-
niques in this setting.
By contrast to these systems, the emphasis in our approach is
not directly on optimization of the planning (though that remains,
of course, the ﬁnal goal), but on automating the market interaction
between several companies in a multi-party logistics negotiation.
Our approach can be seen as creating a testbed, in which each com-
pany or carrier can then apply its own optimization and bidding
techniques, the performance of these techniques can then be easily
measured and compared.
The approach we take is most similar to the work which pro-
poses different trading platforms to test different aspects of bid-
ding and decision making in electronic markets. There are many
such platforms proposed in multi-agent literature, the most well
known being the Trading Agent Competition (TAC); the most sim-
ilar TAC to our approach is, probably, the supply chain TAC version
(Sadeh et al., 2003). Of course, our platform may not have all the
sophisticated features of the TAC platforms, but unlike TAC, the
starting point of our work was in the applicability of the market
setting to a real business case, rather than scientiﬁc curiosity or
relevance. To the best of our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst paper to de-
scribe an agent-mediated auction platform that is modeled around
a real life business scenario, where the orders characteristics, costs,
proﬁt margins etc. all resemble those encountered in real life.
Another important aspect of our platform is the ability to inte-
grate human bidders and automated trading strategies in the same
platform. We feel this is crucial for real business adoption of agent-
mediated electronic market techniques because, at least for some
of the interacting parties, the human owners will want to remain
in control, before delegating any ﬁnancial decision (e.g. bidding)
to a software agent. In multi-agent literature there are some games
speciﬁcally developed to test human decision making in negotia-
tion and auctions (a good example is the Colored Trails game
(Grosz et al.)), but again our platform has the advantage of allow-
ing us to asses such decisions in a real business environment. Final-
ly, somewhat related to our approach is work on designing stock
market trading platforms to test automated bidding strategies (of
which PLAT (Kearns & Ortiz, 2003) is a well-known example).
While this line of work also uses real ﬁnancial order data to design
a realistic market, the characteristics of stock markets (i.e. double
auction setting) is very different from the transportation business
case we consider.
We conclude that, overall, our platform did achieve the scope it
was built for: to convince Vos Logistics Organizing that the an
agent-based approach is a valid solution for their business prob-
lem. Nevertheless, there are still many aspects open for further re-
search. The ﬁrst would be to conduct a (set of) larger scale
experiments to get more detailed human bidding data, and to de-
velop better techniques to analyze this data. The second is to adapt
some of the bidding strategies developed analytically in our more
theoretical lines of work (Robu & La Poutré, 2008; ‘t Hoen & La
Poutré, 2006; ’t Hoen et al., 2005), and test their performance in
this environment, both against other strategies and against human
planners.
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